I See HowARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1-21; 124-146 (1995) . Professor Zinn illustrates the brutal treatment of Indians both during colonial times and during the first century of the United States' existence. 2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This is the "Indian Commerce Clause," which serves two functions-it provides Congress with power to regulate Indian affairs and it recognizes tribes as political entities distinct from state and federal governments. 3Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
4Id. This trust responsibility has two features. The first feature is the autonomy between tribes and the federal government. One author describes the federal government's original trust responsibility as "a special legal relationship between an Indian tribe and the federal government, in which the tribe is legally separate and independent from state and local political entities." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS 352-53 (James Olson ed.) (1997) . This trust responsibility eroded in the second half of the 19"' century, but was reborn in the 1930s when "the tribes regained their statutory authority as trustees of the federal government who were free from the powers of state and local governmental entities." Id. at 353. The second aspect of the trust responsibility is that it is the burden of the federal government to care for the tribes and the tribes' resources; that is, the tribes are like children to be protected by the United States. See Worcester, 31 U.S. 515. This "trust
In discharging its duty to care for the tribes, the federal government struck a balance with tribes regarding tribal justice systems. After the passage of the Major Crimes Act in 1885, 5 the Bureau of Indian Affairs, through the Courts of Indian Offenses, 6 maintained jurisdiction over major crimes committed on Indian lands. Tribes retained exclusive jurisdiction over lesser crimes and exercised concurrent jurisdiction over many of the major crimes. 7 However, Congress wiped out this arrangement in 1953 when it passed Public Law 280,8 granting to six states exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes committed in Indian country in those states. 9 Public Law 280 created many problems for tribal justice systems, ultimately resulting in higher crime rates for tribes in Public Law 280 states than for tribes in non-Public Law 280 states.
10
As Carol Goldberg-Ambrose, a leading scholar on Public Law 280, puts it: "Tribes had not exactly thrived under the prior regime of federal authority and responsibility. But when the states took over, with their alternating antagonism and neglect of native peoples, tribes had to struggle even harder to sustain their governing structures, economies, and cultures."' ' Any reform of current laws governing jurisdiction over Indian lands must come from Congress, which has long held plenary power over matters concerning Indian lands.
12 Congress' responsibility" has been used by the federal government to promote its agenda in the face of Indian interests at least as often as the federal government has actually pro- is mitigated somewhat by this cash flow. The potential stream of revenue from IGRA is currently cramped, however. Federal courts interpreted IGRA in such a manner that tribes have struggled to open new gaming facilities. ' Lifting court-imposed restrictions on Indian gaming growth could potentially result in greater revenues for tribes, which in turn could facilitate tribal development.
Congress should amend IGRA to direct money generated by Indian gaming toward tribal justice development, and amend Public Law 280 to return criminal jurisdiction to tribes. Doing which Congress exercises similar powers include the administration and government of territories and possessions, the District of Columbia, and federal enclaves. INDIAN LAW 219 (1982 ed.) .
FEuX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
See id. at 220.
14 U.S. CoNSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15
The Indian Commerce Clause is "the legal taproot of the plenary power ascribed by U.S. federal courts to Congress." Johansen, supra note 4, at 69. For a definition of plenary power, seesupra note 12.
1618 U.S.C. § § 1166-1168 (1994) , 25 U.S.C. § § 2701-2721 (1994) . 17 See infra notes 198-214 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' treatment of IGRA. 
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so would allow tribes to fund their own tribal justice systems, rather than rely upon conditional funding, and therefore significantly enhance tribal sovereignty. By amending Public Law 280 and IGRA, Congress could fulfill its Constitutional responsibility toward Indians by creating something for and among Indians. Such a policy would stand in stark contrast to the sad history of degradation and racism perpetrated upon Indians by the United States.
21
This Comment is presented in four parts. Part I details the Congressional motivation behind Public Law 280, the law's design, and its effects. Part II examines the structure of tribal courts, their role in tribal sovereignty, and their relationship to tribal cultures. Part III describes Indian gaming in general, IGRA, and IGRA's destruction by federal courts. Finally, Part IV discusses a plan to combat the raging crime rate on reservations in Public Law 280 states. This plan centers around Congressional amendments to both Public Law 280 and IGRA, the combination of which would produce a return of criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian lands to the tribes and provide a source of funding for tribal justice systems that is independent of any non-tribal government.
I. PUBLIC LAw 280-ITs PURPOSES, DESIGN, AND EFFECTS The United States Congress enacted Public Law 280 in 1953. 22 The law mandated that five states (not including Alaska, which was added later) assume jurisdiction for all criminal offenses committed on Indian land in those states. 23 Public Law 21 The fact that white settlers displaced Indians does not by itself create a shameful history for the United States. Rather, as one Native American author puts it, it's a sad history not because of the influx of settlers-after all, Indians had encroached upon each other for thousands of years. It's a sad history because of the shabby way the new people dealt with tribal Americans: not just the lies, but the utter unwillingness to share an enormous land. WILLIAM LEAST HEAT-MOON, BLUE HIGHWAYS: AJOURNEY INro AMERICA 104 (paperback ed. 1999).
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994).
23 It is important to note that Public Law 280 did not grant states plenary jurisdiction. For example, there were limits on state jurisdiction in the realms of "water rights, taxation of trust property, regulatory control over trust property .. . [and] tribal activity otherwise protected by treaty or statute, and federally protected hunting, trapping, and fishing rights." JAcK UTrER, AMERICAN INDIANS: ANSWERS TO TODAY's QUESTIONS 155 (1993) .
280 has harmed tribes in many ways in the nearly half-century since its passage. One of its most significant effects has been higher crime rates for tribes in Public Law 280 states than for tribes in non-Public Law 280 states. 24
A. PURPOSES
Congress enacted Public Law 280 for three purposes-to reduce lawlessness on Indian lands, to lower federal expenditures, and to further the then-popular policy of assimilating Indians into the general American society.
5
Congress focused primarily on tribal crime problems when passing Public Law 280.26 The House of Representatives originally introduced Public Law 280 as a mechanism for combating tribal crime in California. 27 The Senate eventually expanded the scope of the bill upon finding that "the enforcement of law and order among the Indians in the Indian country had been left largely to the Indian groups [and] A secondary Congressional motivation in passing Public Law 280 was the reduction of federal expenditures, 29 manifested in a refusal to provide funding to the states onto which Public Law 280 forced criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands. Congress' concern for thrift impacted tribes in Public Law 280 states by eliminating virtually all criminal justice funding for tribes, as the federal government was now out of the business and the state governments did not want to commit resources without federal reimbursement. 3°C ongress' third motivation in passing Public Law 280 was to further the existing federal goal of Indian assimilation. 31 This motivation is both implicit and explicit within Public Law 280. Looming over the law's passage were two important federal documents relating to Indian policy. First, in 1949, a report prepared by the Truman Administration recommended that the "Indian problem" would be best solved by the "gradual integra-, tion of all Indians into the general population and economy."
32
Four years later, in 1953, the House passed House Concurrent Resolution 108, which deemed it "the policy of Congress" to make Indians "subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities" as all citizens. 33 This policy of assimilation appears explicitly in the discussion surrounding Public Law 280. One senator noted that Public Law 280 was appropriate because Indians had "reached a state of accultura29See 99 CONG. REc. 9263 (1953) Clear examples of this phenomenon are the murder rates for Indians in the states with the ten highest reservation populations. 64 Of these states, five maintain criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands via Public Law 280.65 In these five Public Law 280 states, Indian murder rates are markedly disproportionate to the percentage of Indians in the resident population. In Minnesota, for example, 7.4% of all murder victims between 1976 and 1996 were Indians, while only 1.2% of the population was Indian. 66 Oregon presents similar numbers (2.7% of murder victims, 1.4% of population),67 as does Alaska (28.0% of murder victims, 15.5% of population). 6 The relative murder and population rates of tribes in nonPublic Law 280 states are in direct contrast to tribes in Public Law 280 states. The same study indicates that Oklahoma Indians made up only 6.2% of murder victims, though they constituted 8.1% of the state's population. 69 Studies of Arizona (4.1% of murder victims, 5.8% of population) 7 " and New Mexico (7.5% of murder victims, 8.9% of population) 71 yield similar results. 
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The crime problems for tribes in Public Law 280 states stem both from a lack of funding for law enforcement and from the breakdown of tribal justice systems. Congress drastically reduced funding for tribal law enforcement when it handed the states jurisdiction for crimes committed on Indian lands but did not appropriate any money for the exercise of such jurisdiction.
Prior to the enactment of Public Law 280, the federal government, through the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("B.I.A."), provided law enforcement for tribes. 73 After Public Law 280's passage, the B.I.A. abandoned its police role, and the states generally refused to pick up the law-enforcement slack.
74 Public Law 280 states also declined to provide tribes with money to develop their own law enforcement agencies. 75 Furthermore, Public Law 280 states either refused to significantly supplement their own police forces for tribal patrol and enforcement, or believed that Public Law 280 prevented state entrance into particular tribal problems. 76 A particularly egregious example occurred in California in the 1970s, 77 when the Torres Martinez tribe suffered environmental pollution due to local companies' dumping of industrial sludge onto tribal lands. Local authorities failed to respond to this criminal act, despite awareness of the problem. 78 Federal authorities, with no duty to act in this situation, dragged their feet for so long before intervening that significant damage was done to tribal lands.
79
72See supra notes 28-29, 71-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' financial motivations in passing Public Law 280 and the result this produced.
73See GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 7, at 20.
See id. at 20-22.
See id. at 11-12.
76See id. at 11-17 (explaining that Public Law 280 specifically prevented states from exercising jurisdiction over the fate of the land held in trust for tribes by the federal government).
77 See id. at 12-20.
78See id. While this particular problem was directly caused by a state's failure to exercise authority, the problem was precipitated by Public Law 280's granting of state jurisdiction. Because the tribe involved stopped receiving federal funding and support for its justice system per Public Law 280, the tribe became entirely dependent upon state intervention, which in this case produced an enforcement vacuum. Not only did tribes suffer a lack of law enforcement, but tribes also abandoned their independent, traditional forms of tribal justice. Perhaps this is explained by the states' view that Public Law 280 granted them exclusive jurisdiction over crimes on Indian lands.!0 For whatever reason, tribal courts in Public Law 280 states lost the funding that previously came from the federal government, 8 1 and the state governments did not fill that funding void. 82 Ultimately, the tribal practice of traditional law fell precipitously in Public Law 280 states.
3
The early 1990s brought signs that the damage wrought by Public Law 280 would be addressed, and possibly combated. Congress passed the Indian Tribal Justice Act ("ITJA") in 1993,84 which called for $58.4 million in annual appropriations specifically for the development of tribal justice systems. 8 5 The act stated that "tribal justice systems are inadequately funded, and the lack of adequate funding impairs their operation." 86 Furthermore, the Clinton Administration adopted the position that the ap? ropriate regulators of tribal justice are the tribes themselves.
However, the failed implementation of ITJA over the past four years largely eclipsed the Act's promise of change for tribes under Public Law 280.88 The money earmarked by the ITJA never reached tribes in Public Law 280 states. 8 9 The Act California, saying his tribe was "caught between the federal government, which, by law, can't provide police protection, and the sheriffs office, which doesn't have the manpower for more assistance"). Public Law 280's deleterious effects on tribes are largely tied to the law's impact on tribal courts. Public Law 280 either entirely decimated or significantly eroded the justice systems in place within most tribes in Public Law 280 states. 100 To determine the source and effects of this breakdown, it is necessary to examine what kind of courts exist in tribes, how they function, their value to tribes, and their effect on tribal crime rates.
A. STRUCTURE OF TRIBAL COURTS
While the diversity of Indian tribes makes neat categorization of tribal justice systems impossible, 1 0 1 some generalizations can be made from historical and anecdotal evidence.
Many Today, many tribal courts employ a combination of AngloAmerican and traditional tribal justice notions.
1 1 2 However, tribal courts vary in the extent to which traditional notions of community and punishment play a role in courts. 1 3 The tribal courts that combine American and traditional notions typically are two-tiered.
1 4 That is, most systems have both trial and appellate courts. Interestingly, the appellate courts often cover multiple tribes.
1 5 These developed tribal justice systems mirror, to a limited extent, those found on the state and federal levels, embracing forms of the adversarial system of litigation.
116
Modem tribal courts have also followed the AngloAmerican model of specialization. 117 Thus, in the 1990s, many tribes developed courts that deal exclusively with gaming, small claims, and administrative issues.
118
While this type of system is generally favored by outside observers, tribal courts built on Anglo-American principles often struggle for legitimacy among tribal members. 9 Part of the reason that tribal courts face an uphill battle in gaining tribal acceptance is that these courts must withstand the scrutiny of federal and state governments.
120
Federal and state governments possess the power to erode tribal court authority and willingly exercise that power. 121 This is not to suggest that tribal justice systems routinely fail to account for tribal norms and customs, however. For example, the Apache tribe embraces its history of creating sentencing strategies that aim to develop the offender's contrition and remorse. 123 Apache legal disputes, therefore, often focus on creating a remedy that promotes reintegration of the offender into society, as well as restoring the reputation of the victim.
124
Another example of how modem tribal courts embrace tribal custom is found on the Navajo reservation. A pair of legal anthropologists 125 studying the Navajo court system in the 1980s found that "the enforcement of social norms pervades tribal courts. [The Navajo Chief Judge] uses Navajo common law daily to decide cases."
126
In fact, the Navajo code provides courts with criteria for situations where custom is determinative 127 and states that " [w] here any doubts arise as to the customs and usages of the Navajo Nation the court may request the advice of counselors familiar with these customs and usages.
" 1 2 8
122 See COOTER & FlEENTSCHER, supra note 113, at 23-28 (discussing how tribal court justices feel pressure to take no part in the executive administration of the tribe, despite the custom thatjudges also help make and enforce rules in certain tribes, in order to appear independent and thereby receive funding). 
B. INDIAN JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND SOVEREIGNTY
In the early years of the United States federal courts recognized Indian tribes as sovereign nations.
12
The courts said this sovereignty was subject to restriction by Congress, however.1 30 Therefore, the baseline assumption, as developed by federal common law, is that tribes are sovereign and that sovereignty is only restricted by explicit acts of Congress. A leading authority on federal Indian law even goes so far as to argue that tribal sovereignty was not created by the federal government, but existed before and independent of the United States.
131
Whatever the source of tribal sovereignty, well-developed Indian justice systems create stronger tribal sovereigns. President Clinton and his Administration's Department ofJustice believe that Indian justice systems should balance Anglo-American ideals with traditional tribal problem-solving methods, as sovereignty is strengthened most if tribal courts can both articulate tribal customs and earn the respect of federal and state governments.
132
Sovereignty is directly related to legal processes. At least one governmental scholar argues that "sovereignty, or acting like a government, centers around questions ofjurisdiction and the ability to tax and zone." 133 Congress' recent positions on Indian affairs illustrate this point. Since the mid-1970s, Congress has promulgated a policy of self-determination for Indians that ultimately seeks stronger Indian sovereigns. 134 time, Congress passed the Indian Tribal Justice Act in 1993, which stated that tribal courts are "the appropriate forums for the adjudication of disputes affecting personal and property rights" and they are "essential to the maintenance of the culture and identity of Indian tribes." 135 Tribal culture and identity are often at odds with the norms enforced by Anglo-American legal systems. 1 36 One Indian law scholar notes the differences between customs embraced by tribal law and norms enforced by American law: tribal law focuses on "communal rights" while American law focuses on individual rights; tribal law emphasizes trusting relationships rather than adversarial relationships; and apology and forgiveness are paramount in tribal law, whereas American law stresses "vindication to society." 137 For Indians, therefore, sovereignty means the ability to operate ajustice system that takes into account the goals and traditions of tribal societies, without direct regard for AngloAmerican ideals. These goals include maintaining a complete society. 138 Indian justice systems are often guided by a "holistic philosophy" 139 that involves a complex series of relationships from the very beginning of a legal dispute. 140 It is the unimpeded expression of these norms, made possible with a strong justice system, that indicates and develops sovereignty. domination of programs for Indians. Congress also passed the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § § 1901-1963 (1994) , which limited the power of state courts to hear Indian child custody cases. Also, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulation Act in 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 1166, 25 U.S.C. § § 2701-2721 (1994), which stated that "a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government." 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
1 5 Indian TribalJustice Support Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3601(5), (7) An anthropological study of tribal courts in the early 1970s142 illustrates the connection between sovereignty and crime.
1 43 This study considered the tribal justice systems of three reservations: the Standing Rock tribe (small in population and resources, located in North Dakota); 144 the Blackfeet tribe (also small in population and resources, located in Montana);
45 and the Navajo reservation (large in population and resources, located primarily in northeast Arizona).146 The two smaller tribes reported crime rates much higher than in the Navajo reservation. 47 The study depicts the Standing Rock tribe as employing very little "white man's law." That is, the Standing 141 It is also noted that those tribes with the most developed court systems-the ones that embrace both tribal customs and American procedures-are exclusively in non-Public Law 280 states. The question remains, however. What has caused the drop in crime rates in these states? Is the drop a result of greater sovereignty or merely not being subject to state criminal jurisdiction? The answer is impossibly unclear, because sovereignty and jurisdiction are so intricately related.
142This study actually is one of the most recent studies of crime on specific Indian tribes. Scholarship and empirical studies in this area are desperately needed if a true understanding of tribal crime is ever to be arrived at. 143See SAMuELJ. BRAKEL, AMERIcAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS (1978) . This study provides one of the only trustworthy sources of crime statistics for Indian lands. However, the author's view of tribal courts is clearly one of disdain ("All steps taken to preserve the tribal courts or the reservation system can only be rearguard actions. The reservations, with their courts and other institutions, are destined to disappear in time .... The time appears to be ripe to expose the temporary, psychological purposes of these institutions and to inform the Indians of more permanent, functional alternatives." Id. at 101-102.). This view renders the conclusions in the study less valuable than the hard evidence presented. 144Id. at 56-57.
14 5 Id-at 67-69.
46 Id. at 79-81.
147 See id. at 28-33. In the Standing Rock reservation in 1972, 1,626 offenses were charged in a population of 4,460, yielding a rate of 36 percent of the population. The rate on the Blackfeet reservation for 1973 was 55 percent (3,319 offenses, population just over 6,000). The rate on the Navajo reservation for 1974 was 26 percent (about 26,000 offenses in a population around 100,000).
Rock courts administer justice very informally and exclusively through Indians trained in neither Anglo-American nor Indian law.141 The Blackfeet courts, by contrast, closely mirrored Anglo-American justice systems. 149 However, theirjudges were not trained and theirjustice system was not well-funded. 50 So, even though the Blackfeet and Standing Rock tribes employed opposite apProaches to tribal justice, both suffered from high crime rates.
The Navajo reservation, on the other hand, had a much lower crime rate than either of the other tribes.
1 52 The Navajo courts are characterized in the study as run by people trained in both American and tribal law. 153 The decisions handed down by these courts embrace much of American legal procedure but maintain a unique application of Indian norms. 1 4 This is the hallmark of the well-developed tribal justice system, and it represents an example of what a tribal court can be when provided with adequate funding.1
Indian reservations have struggled economically since created by the federal government in the mid-19th century. In the early 1990s, thirty-nine percent of Indians were jobless and forty percent lived below the poverty line.1 5 6 The last twenty-five years have seen Indian reservations make an economic impact 148 See id. at 56-67. 149 See BRAxEL, supra note 143, at 67-68 (noting that the Blackfeet court "has the reputation of being a 'good' court among white 'Indian experts,' who are apologetic about the shape of the Standing Rock tribal court specifically, but sold on the tribal court concept." Id. at 69 (emphasis in original) 
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in one area, however: gambling. 157 Gaming brought economic opportunities to tribes on a scale never before seen in Indian country. 158 As might be expected, though, as the amount of money flowing onto tribal lands via gaming increased, so too did governmental interest in Indian gaming. This interplay of Indian, state, and federal interests regarding Indian gaming profoundly affects tribes today. Ultimately, Indian gaming revenues stand as a potential balm for the ills of tribal justice systems in Public Law 280 states.' 5 9
The recent history of Indian gaming can be divided into three stages- (1) As the victories in federal court for tribal gaming accumulated, the governors and law enforcement officials in states in which Indian gambling blossomed came to resent the growing revenue streams.1 75 The states took their grievances to the Supreme Court in 1987 in California v. Cabazon. 176 Though it was the leading Supreme Court opinion on Indian gaming at the time it was made, the Cabazon opinion was surprisingly simple and enjoyed only a short life as the law of the land. The Court employed the same rationale as had lower courts in the previous five years, resting its analysis on the regulation/prohibition distinction.177 In this case, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that California merely regulated, and did not prohibit, "gambling in general and bingo in particular." 178 California, therefore, could not enforce its local ordinances against the tribe for holding bingo and card games on Indian land.
9
Cabazon capped a decade of significant victories in federal court for Indians hoping to catch the gaming gravy train. Congress took control of that train, however, in the year following Cabazon when it passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) 18 IGRA comprehensively regulated the creation and operation of Indian gaming facilities. The general federal regulation of Indian gaming did not necessarily pose any problems for gaming tribes. However, the particular provision of IGRA 174 S. REP. No. 99-493, at 2 (1986) .
175States have a long history of attempting to remove wealth from Indian lands.
The historian Howard Zinn illustrates this pattern during colonial times. See ZINN, supra note 1, at 78-94. Professor Zinn notes instances of colonists massacring Indians north of Boston merely for a piece of land slightly more valuable then their own. Id. at 87. This pattern is also evidenced by Georgia's acts that precipitated the Worcester decision. Georgia's entire motivation in dominating Indian land was that gold had recently been discovered on land that was previously thought worthless. IGRA created three classes of Indian gamin and a federal body to regulate the operation of these classes.' 8 Class I games consist of traditional tribal games of chance, often those used in tribal ceremonies and celebrations.
8 2 Tribes maintain exclusive control over this class of activities.
Glass II games are bingo and card games that state laws allow at least some entities to operate. 183 Class II does not include blackjack or baccarat. A tribe can operate Class II games free from state and federal supervision, so long as neither state nor federal law prohibits the operation of the game. 184 IGRA also requires the tribe to enact a local ordinance governing the Class II gaming enterprise.185 The Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission must approve this ordinance.
186
Finally, Indians retain much less control in deciding when and where to operate Class III games. All games not explicitly covered by either Class I or Class II are Class III games. 8 7 These include blackjack, slot machines, roulette and other highly sophisticated games.
1 8 8 Creating a Class III gaming facility requires two main steps: a tribe must first satisfy all of the demands for opening a Class II operation, 189 then negotiate an 181Id. at § § 2701-2721. 18 1d. at § 2703(7).
14 Id. at § 2710(b) (1) (A).
15Id. at § 2710(b) (1) (B).
18 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (b) (1) (B) (1994). The National Indian Gaming Commission is made up of three members, with the President selecting the Chairman and the Secretary of the Interior picking the other two members. Id. at § 2704(b) (1). The Chairman alone approves tribal ordinances creating Class II or Class III gaming facilities; the whole Commission has the power to levy civil fines, issue subpoenas, monitor gaming operations, and issue reports. Id. at § § 2705-2706. 208 See Commission Report, supra note 18, at 6-10 (noting that the continuing effect of Seminole Tribe has frustrated efforts by some tribes to open Class III gaming facilities). This report was prepared pursuant to a Congressional resolution calling for a multi-year examination of gambling in the United States.
209 See it. at 6-24, recommendation 6.13 (calling for Congressional reconsideration of the mechanism for creating a Class IlI gaming facility).
210 Id. at 6-1-6-2. Note that these numbers are in terms of absolute 1997 dollars.
Thus, this thirty-fold increase does not include inflation.
211 Id. at 6-2. "For example, from 1996 to 1997, tribal gambling revenues increased by 16.5 percent, whereas commercial gambling revenues increased by 4.8 percent." Id.
2 Id.
213 See Commission Report, supra note 18, at 6-2.
Id.
215Id. at 6-16. The Report notes the reduction in unemployment among several tribes with gaming. For example, the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe-located in central Minnesota-reports a drop in the jobless rate from 60 percent to almost zero between 1991 and 1999. The tribe opened two Class HII casinos in 1992, one of which now has a hotel, and is contemplating the building of a golf resort. This casino regularly attracts top entertainers, such as country and western musician Kenny Rogers.
Moreover, tribes have applied gaming profits to the development of critical social and municipal services. 216 Success on reservations with gaming is not only economic; the federal commission studying the subject found that "pride, optimism, hope, and opportunity have accompanied the revenues and programs generated by Indian gambling facilities." 217 Some reservations have decided via referenda not to engage in gaining, 21s concerned that operating gaminn facilities would undermine the cultural integrity of tribes. 2 It is worth noting, though, that a recent Congressional study concluded that "the revenues from Indian gambling have had a significant-and generally positive-impact on a number of reservations." 220 IV. PROPOSAL Public Law 280 has failed to provide Indian reservations with adequate justice systems. Many commentators believe this. 22 ' Still, crafting a workable solution to the problem of inadequate justice systems depends upon a focused understanding of why Public Law 280 has failed. Thus, any solution must incorporate the fact that localized law enforcement and adjudication is best at fighting crime on Indian reservations, 222 and the fact that meaningful tribal sovereignty depends upon having a 216See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 158, at 107 (noting the building of an ultramodem fire department by the Sycuan tribe in California). Another example is the sparkling museum of Indian history and culture built by the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe.
21
7 Commission Report, supra note 18, at 6-16. 218 Id. at 6-2. (The most significant example of this is the Navajo Nation, the nation's largest reservation, which rejected a proposal to negotiate the opening of a casino).
219 Commission Report, supra note 18, at 6-3.
22
0 Id. at 6-14. brought hardship to the affected reservations in the form of state jurisdiction and a withdrawal of federal services"). 222 See supra notes 54-70, 141-155 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between self-government and crime (detailing higher crime rates on tribes in Public Law 280 states). justice system that is truly independent and has adequate resources.
Any solution must also take into account the scope and basis of the relationships between tribes and federal and state governments. Tribes are wards of the federal government; thus, the federal government owes tribes a duty. 224 Furthermore, the federal government has long recognized tribes as distinct governmental entities separate from state or federal governments. 225 Moreover, there is no inherent relationship between tribes and states; 22 6 such a relationship exists only to the extent that those two entities develop one or the federal government creates one. Congress is therefore charged with a duty to legislate for the benefit of the tribes and without concern for tribalstate relationships. Here, the interests of the tribes demand that Congress amend Public Law 280 and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Both must be amended since the former caused increases in crime within tribes and the latter has been rendered unenforceable by the courts.
Public Law 280 should be amended to return criminal jurisdiction to tribal courts. States need not have any criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian lands. In fact, state participation in this area historically has been bad for both 227 tribes and states. 217, 219-223 (1959) . Williams held that the basic principle announced in Worcester survives today-"absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Id. at 220. 
DAN1EL TWETTEN
has no concern with tribal activity. 235 Thus, the challenge would be unsuccessful. Congress clearly has the power to dictate broad restrictions in an amended IGRA. Their power over tribes is plenary, 236 and gaming falls within the Indian Commerce Clause.
2 3 7 It is this power that alloWs Congress to dictate the flow of Indian gaming revenues in the current statute. Section 2710 of the IGRA, for example, stipulates that net revenues from Indian gaming be distributed for limited purposes. 238 The statute states that "net revenues from any tribal gaming are not to be used for purposes other than" funding "tribal government operations," providing for the "general welfare" of tribal members, promoting "tribal economic development," donating to charity, or helping to fund local non-Indian governmental operations. 239 Since the economic benefits of Indian gaming may be directed toward socially beneficial goals, herein lies the answer to the problem of funding tribal courts.
Congress should amend IGRA to enhance section 2710 by dictating that a fixed percentage of gaming profits go toward the development of tribal justice systems.
2 4 0 The current IGRA does not identify specific targets for Indian gaming revenue; rather, it creates five broad categories of permissible beneficiaries. Congress can-and should-earmark a portion of Indian Id. at 219-22.
236See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 147-149 (SouterJ., dissenting). 29 Id. 240 The new IGRA should further enhance the efficacy of Indian selfdetermination by not allowing states to interfere with Indian gaming based on the regulatory/prohibitory distinction. Thus, the new IGRA should explicitly state that whether a state outlaws all forms of gambling is not determinative of whether a tribe can operate a gaming operation. Such a move would abrogate the traditional state argument that if a state's citizens can't do something anywhere else in the state, then tribes shouldn't be allowed to either. By allowing tribes to choose to operate gaming facilities, notwithstanding state law, Congress would reaffirm the fact that states and tribes do not have any relationship, although reservations happen to exist within a particular state. gaming revenue specifically for the development of tribal justice systems.
241
Calling for an amended IGRA that would still not allow complete Indian autonomy is a recognition of political reality. Congress is unlikely to relinquish all control over Indian gaming; Congress has never in the past given tribes authority over a policy area that Congress at one time controlled. If an amended section 2710 of IGRA allowed Congressional control over the programs receiving gaming profits, then such an amendment would be more palatable to Congress. While such an arrangement is arguably less satisfying than complete Indian autonomy, it is a more realistic starting point for a productive discussion of what to do about crime on reservations in Public Law 280 states and IGRA.
The benefits of such a program would be twofold. First, and most obvious, such a move would provide a sorely needed revenue source for tribal justice development. Congress' findings regarding the Indian Tribal Justice Act acknowledge the problem: tribal justice systems are integral aspects of tribal government, 2 4 2 these systems "are inadequately funded," and "the lack of adequate funding impairs their obligation." 243 Furthermore, Congress found that "tribal government involvement in and commitment to improving tribal justice systems is essential to the accomplishment of the goals" of the statute.
44
This proposal would increase tribal independence. Allowing tribes freedom from state regulation in opening gaming halls would promote autonomy and economic development. In addition, the corresponding funding increase for tribal justice systems would not only promote sovereignty, but lower crime rates.
That said, this proposal is not perfect in any respect. First, from a philosophical standpoint, a proposal granting complete 241 This money could serve several purposes. It would allow greater training of judges and advocates; more legal periodicals could be purchased; a more thorough source of tribal court opinions could be developed; court reporters could be hired; police could be hired and provided with equipment; and detailed studies of tribal crime could be commissioned.
242 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
244Id.
244 Id.
tribal autonomy in all affairs may be more appealing to some. Second, this proposal may result in more gaming in the United States;2 4 5 given that gaming generally operates as a regressive tax, this too could be viewed as a cost. Third, tying Indian development so closely to gaming could hurt those tribes located in very rural areas that could not attract non-Indians to gaming halls. 46 Finally, Indian tribes that have chosen not to have gaming might feel compelled to offer it if alternate means of funding their tribal justice systems were not provided. At the very least, however, this proposal presents a fresh alternative for significant change in areas (tribal justice and economic development) that have suffered for decades. The potential costs are outweighed by the chief benefits of the proposal: increased sovereignty for tribes, potentially lower crime rates, and increased opportunity for tribal economic development.
V. CONCLUSION The early growth of the United States subjugated Indians and forced them from their homes. Congress and the Supreme Court, recognizing this problem, articulated legal standards that made Indians' well-being a Congressional concern.
In the middle of the 2 0 'h century, as the United States attained prominence on the international stage, Congress abandoned the theory that Indian reservations should remain independent nations. It was in this atmosphere that Congress enacted Public Law 280. During the past twenty years, however, Congress and the executive branch have once again recognized that tribes benefit from being both independent and strong. The penultimate benefit of this movement would be to return the exercise ofjustice to all tribes, while at the same time allowing tribes to engage unfettered in the most viable export in the history of reservations-gambling.
Such a move would simul- 245 Gaming may increase as a whole because states would no longer be able to stifle tribes' attempts at creating gaming facilities. 246 However, an amended IGRA could require gaming tribes to pay a certain percentage into a fund that is then distributed to non-gaming tribes. Such a system would be similar to the current method the Federal Communications Commission employs to guarantee telephone service to poor and rural areas. 
